CPS: Beyond Usability:

Applying Value Sensitive Design Based Methods to Investigate Domain Characteristics for Security for Implantable Cardiac Devices

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Implantable Cardiac Devices

- Pacemakers
 - Correct for slow heart rhythms
 - Correct for no heart rhythm




- Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillators
 - "Reset" potentially fatal heart rhythms

Wireless ICD Security & Impacts

[Halperin 2008] [Gollakota 2011]

- Private information
 - Obtain serial number,
 patient name, diagnosis

- Health impacts
 - Turn off therapies (defibrillation)
 - Induce cardiac fibrillation



Wireless ICD Security

- Need more security
 - 1. No individualized security
 - 2. Demonstrated security vulnerabilities

More security is needed

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Proposal: Password on file

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Cost: Inaccessibility

- In emergencies
- Travel
- Switching providers

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Security: The Science and Art of Tradeoffs



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Implantable Cardiac Devices: Broader Context

Defense designs require interaction with domain experts

Exploratory studies surface issues

Quantitative Research

How much?

Qualitative Research

How much of what?

Qualitative Research

How much of what?

Why?


Human-Centric Investigation: Implantable Cardiac Devices

 Question: What are relevant costs (to avoid) with respect to security systems for implantable cardiac devices?



Patient Study

 Semi-structured interviews with patients with IMDs



 Elicited reactions to security system concepts











[**Denning 2010**]

The Medical Ecosystem: Many Roles, Complex Interactions

Primary Care Physician

Hospital Billing

FDA

Medical Technicians

Electrophysiologist

Insurance Companies

Nurse Practitioner

Nurse

Cardiologist

Emergency Room Staff

Implanting Surgeon

Anesthesiologist

Device Manufacturer Representative

Richness of underlying issues

- Richness of underlying issues
 - Stakeholder priorities

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 - Terminology

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Design better security solutions

Framework: Value Sensitive Design [Friedman 2006]

Account for people's values


Framework: Value Sensitive Design [Friedman 2006]

Account for people's values

Account for **direct** and **indirect** stakeholders

Framework: Value Sensitive Design

[Friedman 2006]



Qualitative Study Design

- 3 Workshops:
 - 24 providers
 - Cardiologists, nurses, anesthesiologists, etc.

- Workshop format facilitates:
 - Interactive discourse
 - Surfacing consensus, tensions

Group Activities & Paper Instruments

Workshop Format

- Stakeholder Perspectives
- Metaphor Generation
- Critiques and Concerns

[Kensing 1991] [Yoo 2013]

- Evaluation of Security System Concepts
- Open-ended Discussion

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Stakeholder Perspective Data Analysis


- Open-ended answers used to develop topic categories
- Independent researcher used categories to code participant responses
- Kappa = 0.745
 - >0.75 is excellent agreement
 - 0.40-0.75 is intermediate to good [Fleiss 2003]
 - 0.61-0.80 is substantial agreement [Landis 1977]

Stakeholder Perspective Results Inform Security Design

- Access & Sharing
- Compatibility
- Correct Usage
- Device Battery Life
- Device Compactness / Inertness
- Device Ecosystem

- Device Functionality
- Patient / Patient Health
- Programming
- Quality of Data
- Remote Monitoring
- Security & Privacy
- Surgery & Healing

Stakeholder Perspective Results Inform Security Design



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Security System Concepts













- Surveyed literature for proposed security solutions
- Chose representative concepts with varied properties
- Participants:
 - Provided overall evaluations
 - Commented on properties



Medical Alert Bracelet with Password





Medical Alert Bracelet with Password



UV-Visible Tattoo



[Denning 2010] [Schechter 2010]



Medical Alert Bracelet with Password



UV-Visible Tattoo



[Denning 2010] [Schechter 2010]

Criticality-Aware IMD



[Gupta 2006]









Positive Properties (of Disliked Systems)

- ↑ Facilitates emergency access
- ↑ Reassures patient
- ↑ Not visible

- **Cheap**
- ↑ No patient effort
- ↑ Always present









Negative Properties

- ↓ Access is not guaranteed
- ↓ Cultural, social, or personal objections
- ↓ Broadcasts patient condition to others
- ↓ Potential impact on battery life

Fail-Open Wristband with Safety Features



[Denning 2008] [Gollakota 2011] [Xu 2011]

- Presence blocks unauthorized access
- In its absence, system fails into an open state accepts all communications

Fail-Open
Wristband
with Safety
Features



[Denning 2008] [Gollakota 2011] [Xu 2011]

- ↑ Fail-open
- Safety features
- ↑ Security
- ↑ Empowers patient
- ↑ Visual cue
- ↓ Security
- ↓ 911 false positives
- ↓ Visual indicator
- ↓ Training
- Expense

Human-Centric Investigation Indicates Security Costs to Avoid

Security Solution Costs Inaccessibility

Battery life

Money

(→ denied claims)

Patient privacy

Patient comfort

+ mental health

Infection

Implant size

Incompatibility

Human-Centric Investigation: Implantable Cardiac Devices

 Study indicates security costs to avoid when designing security solutions



Additional features (e.g., safety)
 may entice buy-in



Tensions exist (e.g., visual indicators)



Beyond Implantable Cardiac Devices

Connectivity



Sensors



Actuators



Usage Scenario





Human-Centric Investigation: Implantable Cardiac Devices

- Study indicates security costs to avoid when designing security solutions
- Additional features (e.g., safety) may entice buy-in
- Tensions exist (e.g., visual indicators)
- Defense designs require interaction with domain experts
- Exploratory studies surface issues





